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Introduction
This paper seeks  to examine the  expectations  and motives  behind original
United States aid to developing countries.  The paper takes  as  its  starting
point  the  Act for International  Development  of  1950,  first  proposed as  the
fourth point of  President harry S. Truman's  inaugural address  of  January 20,
1949.  In this  speech  he  proposed
... a bold new program for making the benefits  of  our
scientific advances and  industrial progress  available  for
the  improvement and growth of  underdeveloped areas.
This program was  to  consist  of  two  parts.  The  first was a technical
assistance program which would help transfer modern techniques and know-how
to the  less  developed areas  (LDA's).  In Truman's words:
The United States  is  preeminent among nations  in  the
development of  industrial and  scientific techniques.  The
material  resources which we  can afford  to use  for  the
assistance of  other peoples  are limited.  But  our  impon-
derable  resources  in  technical2knowledge are  constantly
growing and are  inexhaustible.
The  second part  of  the program authorized the  Export-Import Bank to
issue guarantees  to private  investments in  developing countries  against
certain risks  peculiar to  foreign investment.-2-
The Point  IV program as  it  came to  be  called marks a logical beginning in
American  development  assistance  policy.  Prior  to  it  U.S.  aid  to  developing areas
had  been sporadic, with  the  limited objectives  of  winning political  support,
relieving exceptional disasters in  specific countries,  or assisting  in post
World-War II  reconstruction.  With the  significant exceptions  of  aid  to East
Asia and Latin America, previous  aid had  not  focused on development as  an issue.
The Point IV  program was thus  the United States'  first  attempt  at  a global
program to attack the  root causes  of  development on a long term basis.
As  a study of  Point  IV,  this  paper does not  attempt to  cover the earlier
work done  in Latin America and East Asia.  For detail on these programs,  see
History-of  the Office of  the  Coordinator  of  Inter-American Affairs (Washington:
GPO,  1947)  and The Program of  the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in
China (Economic Cooperation Administration pamphlet  1951).  These programs were
significant  but limited to  certain geographical areas.  -The paper also does  not
cover the concurrent  work being done  in the United Nations.  For a study of  this
see "United Nations Technical Assistance,"  Background Paper No.  74,  United
Nations Department of  Public Information  (January 1953).
Today's conventional wisdom is  that  the Point IV  program was  a sincere but
misguided attempt  by  the United States  to extend the successes  of  the Marshall
3 Plan to  the developing world.  It  is  popularly  believed that during the 19 50's
experts  believed that  underdevelopment  stemmed from a lack of  infrastructure
which made private investment unprofitable.  By transfering  large  amounts  of
financial capital  to the  developing areas,  the  government would make possible
the  construction of  large  infrastructure projects.  This would establish  the
proper climate  for private investment  in  the  industrial sector.  Since  the
Marshall Plan had resulted in dramatic  improvement  in the Gross National Product
of  Europe, a similar program would succeed in other regions  as well.-3-
This paper reexamines  that  belief  by  studying the writings  of  the  period.
As  a first  step  it  reviews  the  major legislation involved.  The second part of
the paper  synthesizes academic writings  of  che period.  In  order  to  see which
views influenced the legislation,  it  then reviews  some  of  the testimony given at
congressional hearings  on  the authorization and appropriation of  funds  for these
programs.
This study will conclude  that  the  ideas  behind these  original development
programs  largely mirror those held today.  Although their understanding of  the
development process was  not as  refined or  detailed as  we  see today,  the men and
women behind the Point  IV  legislation were  far  from naive in their beliefs.
They understood that economic development was  a long and  complicated process
which depended upon political, technical, and social,  as well  as economic, fac-
tors.  The program they proposed  concentrated primarily  on small scale  technical
projects which would  now be  classified under basic needs.  As  such it  was seen
as  the antithesis  rather than a copy of  the Marshall Plan.
The  Legislation  Behind  Point  IV
The Point  IV  program first surfaced as  a major part of President Truman's
inaugural address.  It  seems  clear that  its  inclusion was due  largely  to  the
initiative of  the White House.  The  role played  by  the State Department is  less
clear.  The State Department  apparently had  not  been involved in  developing the
4
original  program.  Its  inclusion in  the speech was  based largely  on decisions
by  the White House  staff,  particularly Clark Clifford, who wanted a new  ini-
tiative to present  to  the American public.  However, Johnathan Bingham attri-
butes the Point  IV idea  to Benjamin Hardy  of  the State Department.  According
to Bingham, the Hardy proposal had  been rejected by  the State Department  before
it  was brought  to  the White House.  Bingham indicates  that  its  inclusion  in the
inaugural speech was opposed by  the State Department  leadership.-4-
Congress began considering Point  IV  legislation shortly  after President
Truman's  inaugural  address.  Congress  considered each  part  of  the  program
separately.  Each party presented its  own  bill authorizing a technical coopera-
tion program.  The  first bill,  supported by  the Administration, was  sponsored by
the chairman of  the Foreign Affairs Committee John Kee and labeled H.R. 5615.
It  found  that  the U.S.  had a common interest in  the material progress  of  all
peoples and established  an official policy  to promote the  development of
economically underdeveloped areas of  the world.  To achieve  this,  H.R. 5615
authorized the President to enter into  technical cooperation programs with funds
to  be appropriated  in the  future.  It also  authorized the creation  of  an
9 Institute of  International Technical Cooperation within the State Department.
The Kee bill sought  the participation of  the United Nations  and other  inter-
national organizations wherever practicable  and encouraged the  involvement of
private  agencies  and  persons.0
Congressman Christian A. Herter  of  Massachusetts  introduced  the Republican
alternative, known as H.R. 6026.1  It  placed much greater emphasis  on  the  role
of  private investment  in the process  of  development.1  The Herter bill sought
to establish a Foreign Economic Development Administration within the State
Department. 13  The United States  would enter into  bilateral treaties and
agreements with other nations  as  a condition to  their participation  in the
14
program.  These agreements would protect private investment  from uncompensated
15
expropriation, foreign exchange  restrictions, and  double taxation.  They would
also create joint  commissions  to oversee each nation's economic progress.6
Besides providing a better environment  for  private investment,  H.R. 6026
directed the Administration  to support Export-Import Bank  loans  to  participating
nations.17   The Bank could extend  loans  only when the  project  to be  financed
was economically  sound and private  financing was unavailable. • A  Board con--5-
sisting of  twelve  private persons with experience in  foreign trade would review
these findings.19
Under  the Herter  bill,  the Administration would also sponsor technical
missions  in the fields  of  health, sanitation, agriculture,  and education, and
20
provide assistance on increasing economic efficiency.20  Although H.R. 6026
allowed for participation in United Nations  programs,  it  did not  permit the
government to  transfer control over  the method of  spending appropriated funds.2 1
On June 5, 1950,  Congress passed  into law  a compromise bill known as  the
22
Act for International Development.2  Like  the Kee bill,  it  recognized a common
interest in  the  freedom and  economic and  social progress  of  all  peoples,  a
progress which could  be furthered  through a cooperative endeavor to exchange
technical knowledge and  skills and  to encourage the  flow of  investment  capital
23 to  less developed areas.2  Such a program could make  its maximum contribution
only where there was an adequate understanding of  the mutual advantages  of
private investment.  Investors  had a duty  to  develop  local resources  in a wise
and efficient  manner, to  bear a fair  share of  the nation's  tax burden, and  to
24 provide  their workers with adequate wages  and working conditions.  For their
part,  host nations needed to realize  the importance of  creating a climate
capable of  attracting business investment.25
Congress placed  several restrictions  on  the scope  of  the program.  Agencies
reviewing requests  for aid were  to  consider whether the  assistance was  part  of  a
balanced and  financially sound  program for  integrated development.2  They were
also  to examine whether private capital was available either  internally or
externally  in amounts sufficient to  finance the  projects without public
27
assistance.  The Administration could authorize assistance only where  the
recipient nation:
(1) paid  a fair share  of  the  program's cost,-6-
(2) provided all  necessary information concerning the  program and
gave  it  full  publicity,
(3) sought  to  fully integrate  the program into  its  overall  technical
cooperation  policy,
(4) made effective use of  the program's  results,  and
(5) cooperated with other nations  in the mutual exchange of  technical
28
knowlege  and  skills.
Finally  the Act directed the  termination of  any program which was  inconsistent
with American foreign policy.29   Congress also retained oversight powers  by pro-
viding  that  it  could  terminate any  program by  a joint  resolution  of  both
houses.  It  also  directed the President to  prepare an annual report  of  all
operations  under  the  Act.3 1
The Act sought  the greatest practicable participation of  private agencies
and persons.32  Partly to  ensure this,  ft  established an advisory  board of  up to
thirteen private individuals drawn from voluntary agencies,.business,  labor,
agriculture, health, and education to advise and tonsult with the program's
administrator concerning the general policy  of  technical assistance.33
Where desirable,  a joint  commission composed  of  nationals  of  both the U.S.
34
and  the recipient nation would oversee assistance to  each nation.3  As part  of
their duties  these joint  commissions could prepare  studies  recommending specific
35
projects  contributing to economic development.  The Act also authorized  the
President  to participate  in and  contribute  to  multilateral programs  of  technical
assistance  wherever  possible. 3 6
A total.of  $35 million was  authorized to establish such a program.37
Academic Literature
Around 1948  a number of  articles  and reports  dealing with  the  subject of
economic development began to appear.  Many of  these were  published  in economic
and foreign affairs journals.  During this  time  the U.S.  government  commissioned-7-
two  major studies  on development policy.  In  1949  President Truman ordered
William P. Gray  to prepare  a report  on America's  international  economic
policy.3  When.  Dwight D. Eishenhower  became president,  he  commissioned  his  own
study prepared by a specially-created board under  the  chairmanship  of  Nelson A.
39
Rockefeller.  Finally,  the United Nations  formed its  own group  of  experts,
including W. Arthur Lewis  and Theodore  Schultz  to prepare  a study  on economic
40
development.
Taken as  a whole, these writings  indicate a broad concensus  of  intellectual
opinion on  the nature  of  economic underdevelopment  and  the general policies
which would help alleviate it.  Most authors  agreed on a number of  basic
points.41
There was widespread  recognition that  any program to  promote economic deve-
42
lopment would have  to  be  coordinated and comprehensive.4  It would need  to
focus on a number of  interrelated fields at  once such  as  health, education,
43
infrastructure, and agriculture.43  Fragmentary assistance  limited  to  certain
fields or  of  short duration was unlikely  to  accomplish much.44
Secondly, economic  development required a balanced pattern of  growth within
45
less developed areas  (LDA's).45   This  meant  that industrialization would have  to
move  beyond the extractive industries  into activities  involving processing,
46
manufacturing, and  import  substitution.4  More importantly,  it  also meant  that
countries would have  to devote  attention to  their agricultural  sectors,  focusing
on expanding agricultural productivity  and  establishing small scale cottage
47
industries within rural areas.  Contrary  to  later perceptions, writers  of  the
time  stressed rural development  as  a prerequisite  to  broader economic growth.
There was also  agreement  on  the nature  of  development programs.  Modest  but
well-researched projects were more likely  to succeed  than  large,  ambitious
49
ones.  There was  a real limit  to  the ability of  LDA's  to absorb capital  and-8-
technology.5  Ignoring  this  constraint was  likely to  result  in waste  and
inefficiency.51  To  facilitate this  a lot  of  the  initial  finances would go  into
surveys  of  national needs  and resources  to match technical  skills  to  the  con-
ditions within each nation.5  Economic and  technical assistance programs  of  the
53 West,  if  attempted at  all, should be  conducted on a generous  scale.  Excessive
concern with cost and rates  of  return would only slow down  the  pace  of  develop-
ment  and create friction  between donors  and  recipients,  as would unnecessary
54 conditions on receiving such aid.54  Partly to  alleviate this,  the involvement
of  international agencies in  the development process  received wide support.55
Finally,  donors would have  to avoid persuing economic or  trade  policies which
conflicted with the broader  results of  their technical  assistance program.56
This meant opening up domestic markets  to increased LDA production and elimi-
nating disincentives  to  the flow  of  capital abroad.57
One of  the primary  targets of  development efforts would have  to be  the
improvement  of  a nation's human capital through expanded health and education
services.  Although some writers were strongly  concerned about  the  degree
59 to which population growth impeded economic development,5  all recognized
that  improved public health was crucial to  increases  in human productivity.60
There was also a great deal  of  agreement  on  the  nature of  economic
underdevelopment.  The  primary characteristic of  such  a system was  low  labor
61 productivity caused by a lack  of  accompanying factors  of  production.  To
eliminate  this  shortage, the LDC's  needed a positive  rate  of  saving.62  Unlike
Europe,  however, low  productivity in LDA's was  compounded by  a situation of
absolute poverty, making it  difficult  to accumulate a surplus  of  production
63
over consumption which could  be used for reinvestment.  Part  of  the  solution
thus  lay in transfers of  capital from the West  to  the  less  developed areas.-9-
Under classical economic  theory  this  transfer  of  funds would occur
automatically.  6  There was great doubt,  however,  as  to whether these  flows
would actually  be sufficient.  In many  cases developing areas  lacked  the
physical and  human capital necessary  to attract private  investment.  As  a
prerequiste  to private  capital flows, public economic and technical assistance
would have  to  finance  the  creation of  a climate  in which future investments
could profit.67
Most disagreement  took place  over  the nature and  extent of  government
attempts to  finance capital movement overseas.6  Many  experts believed that,
in  order for developing areas  to  obtain the  capital needed to finance
economic  growth,  the  United  States  would  have  to  begin  a  program  of  large
loans and  grants.6  Others felt  strongly that  the government should confine
its  efforts  to sponsoring technical  exchange programs  and encouraging
developing countries  to establish favorable  climates for private  investment.70
Testimony at  the  Congressional  Hearings
Both Houses  of Congress  held annual  authorization and appropriations
hearings  on  the technical  assistance program from its  inception.  The  first
authorization hearings,  held in  1949-50,  dealt exclusively with  the  new
Point IV  program.  From then  on, however,  testimony  on technical assistance
was  incorporated within hearings  on the overall  foreign aid bill.  This
paper covers  the original authorization7  and appropriation7  hearings  for
technical assistance,  the first hearings  on authorizing Export-Import Bank
investment guarantees,73  and  the  1952  authorization hearings. 74
The testimony  at  each hearing reflected a number  of  different  views  on
the nature  of  economic development.  Over half  the  testimony  came from
Administration officials  justifying budget requests.  Congress did  allow
some opportunity  for  the expression of  public views,  although it  oftenconfined this  to  short  ten-minute statements  and  the  reprinting of written state-
ments  in  the record.  Almost all  the private speakers were affiliated with an
organization.  Somewhat surprisingly, Congress did not  call in any  outside
experts  to  comment  on  the Administration's program.  As a result there are no
unaffiliated representatives  of  the academic  community at  the  hearings.
A.  The  Administration  Viewpoint
host of  the Administration's  testimony came  from officials within  the  State
Department or  agencies under  it.  The statements  of  other Departments  dealt
largely with their perceived role in  the  new program.  Taken as a body,  this
testimony gives a clear picture of  how  the Administration viewed  the nature  and
extent  of  its  program.
The basic premise behind the Administration's  policy was  that underdevelop-
ment  stemmed from two  shortages;  a shortage  of knowledge and a shortage  of  capi-
tal.  The Point  IV  program would  limit  itself  to meeting the  first shortage  by
projects designed to  transfer technical information and know-how.  Most  of  the
external capital needed for  investment would have  to  come from the private  sec-
tor.  In those areas,  such as  infrastructure and social services, where private
business could not  capture enough of  the benefits  to make investment profitable,
the Export-Import Bank and  the International  Bank for  Reconstruction and
Development  would  extend  loans.
The Administration strongly supported the  concept  of Point  IV embodied in
the Kee  bill.  It based this  support  on economic, political, social,  and  humani-
75
tarian grounds.  Of  these, economic and  political  (security) justifications
received the most emphasis.  Purely humanitarian concerns  rarely  appeared as  a
major selling point  in the Administration's  testimony.
In  the program's  first years,  its  economic effects  received the most  empha-
sis.  The Point  IV effort of  technical assistance and  investment guarantees
-10--11-
would go  far  toward eliminating poverty  and  increasing living  standards.  Since
extractive  industries  accounted for  much  of  the  developing world's  economic
power,  their expansion would increase  the  supply  of  raw materials  available to
76
the West.  In addition,  the United States  had most  of  the  physical capital and
consumer goods desired  by  other  nations.  One of  the chief  obstacles to  expanded
trade with LDCs was  their  lack of  purchasing power  in  dollars, the so-called
9977
"dollar shortage."  By helping developing nations  expand  their  exports  and
earn dollars,  the U.S.  would build up  the  market for  its  own exports  and expand
78
the world economy.8  Supporters of  the bill often pointed to  the  fact  that
there was  a positive  correlation between a nation's GNP and  the amount  of
American imports  it purchased.79
The Administration also focused on the political-security  benefits  of  the
program.  The first hearings were held shortly after  the communist  victory in
China.  There was a popular perception  that  Soviet-style communism was
threatening to  spread to  other areas  of  the world as well.8 1  One of  its  chief
weapons was  the ability  to  appeal  to  traditionally downtrodden groups with false
promises of  economic growth and equality.  The Point IV  program, by dealing with
the  underlying causes  of  poor productivity in key  areas  such as  agriculture,
forestry and  fisheries, would counteract  this  propaganda with positive
action. 2   It would show people everywhere that  freedom, not  communism held the
83
key  to economic prosperity.83  By  stressing areas  such  as  health, education, and
other social services,  the technical  exchange program would concentrate directly
84
on improving  the way people  lived.  This  would reduce,  the chances  of  social -r-
unrest and  lead to  political stability.  A key  component  of  this  effort  lay  in
convincing recipient nations  that  the U.S.  was  not just  acting  in its  own self-
interest or attempting  to establish economic imperialism but was  truly concerned
with meeting the needs  of  LDC's.86-12-
The Administration also spent  a great  deal of  time  laying out  the  proposed
structure of  the program.  The first  part  of  Point  IV would consist  of  a tech-
nical  assistance program.  This  program would  concentrate on  small  scale  pro-
jects with the  purpose of  transfering useful knowledge and techniques  to
87
developing areas.7  Much  of  this would consist of  sending American experts  into
88
rural areas  to train the  local population.  The program would also  fund the
89
education of  local citizens  in  the U.S.  Pilot  projects played a key  role  in
the program.  Once  the usefulness of  a particular method was demonstrated to
90
LDC's,  they  themselves would invest  in  its  expansion.  The underlying philo-
sophy of such programs was  similar to  that  behind  the Peace Corps  initiative
launched over a decade  later.  The initiative  of  proposing possible projects  lay
with the recipient  nation.9 1
because of  its  limited scope,  the program's  cost  could be kept down.  In
most  cases  the  recipient  nation  would provide  most  of  the  capital,  paying  for
92
all local costs and a share of  the total exchange costs:  This portion would
increase as projects  matured and demonstrated their value to  local citizens.93
The program would concentrate its  efforts  on  the exchange of  knowledge, not
capital.94  This would help LDA's  overcome their critical shortage  of  skilled
95
personnel.5  The program would not be  involved in either the  funding or
construction of  large capital projects.  Administration officials  repeatedly
assured skeptical congressmen  that  the program would not  involve the  large  capi-
97
tal expenditures  of  the Marshall Plan.
Because of  its emphasis on the  transfer of  knowledge between individuals
the availability of  adequately  trained, competent  personnel appeared as  the main
98
bottleneck  to  the program's  expansion.  Around 2,500 people were  needed the
first year alone.  Supporters repeatedly stressed  the importance  of  sending
1U0
the proper people abroad.  To  facilitate this,  the Administration promised
wherever possible to use private agencies already  doing similar work.-13-
Actual coordination of  the program would come under a newly established
Technical Cooperation Agency  (TCA) within  the State Department.  This agency
would supervise  each nation's  participation in the  program;  specific technical
assistance projects,  however, would be  handled by  the government agency best
102
equipped to work in the area.  Under  an agreement  between the TCA and  the
<oiL.oQA-i  C.,\  ,,•  103
ureopean  Cooperation Agency  (ECA), there would be  no  duplication of  efforts.
The Point IV  program would not undertake bilateral programs in Europe, with the
104
exception of Turkey.  The ECA would continue to  handle technical  assistance
105
to  colonies until  its authorization expired in  1952.  This assistance would
be  integrated with existing programs in Europe dealing with agriculture,
106
forestry, industry, mining,  and transportation.  In  both  the  colonies and
Turkey, Point  IV would limit  its efforts  to  fields which condition economic
development, especially health, education, and  basic training.  In all  other
countries, TCA would operate alone.
Many speakers viewed the program as  merely a natural extension of  success-
108
ful  programs in other areas.  In  particular,  they stressed previous efforts
109
in China and Latin America, often by  private agencies.
Finally, Administration officials  saw  the need for  a sustained commitment
110  111
toward development.  Progress would be  slow and often intangible.  One
112
speaker saw  the possibility of  a fifty year program.  Unlike the Marshall
Plan which had  a life expectancy  of  four years,  Congress was warned not  to
113
expect  quick  or  dramatic  results.
The Administration recognized that  technical assistance alone would not  pro-
duce economic development.  In  order  to  take  advantage of  new techniques,  LDC's
would need investment  capital.  To  the extent  possible,  this would have  to  come
114
from within the LDC's  themselves.  The extent of  their poverty would prevent
this  from being enough,  however, necessitating a flow  of external  capital.-14-
Most  of  the outside  capital would  have to  come from  the private  sector,
which  could  transfer  with  it  the  managerial  and  business  skills  necessary  to
make investments profitable.  One  of  the  main reasons why private  funds  were
not  moving abroad was  the negative climate which existed  in most  developing
areas.  117  The principle deterrents  included unstable political conditions,
balance of  payments  problems,  and government interference with private  foreign
investment.  This,  together with the high rate  of  return available  at  home,
119
made foreign investment unattractive.
To  reverse  this  situation, the government proposed  a series  of  initiatives
120
aimed at making foreign investment  more secure.  One of  these was the
negotiation of  bilateral treaties  of  friendship, commerce,  and navigation with
other countries.  These treaties  sought to  establish a better climate  for
foreign investment  by ensuring adequate  compensation for expropriation,  and
guaranteeing, among other things,  a reasonable opportunity  to  remit earnings  and
withdraw capital, and  reasonable freedom  to manage, operate, and  control
enterprises;  they  also provided for  the personal security and  nondiscriminatory
122
treatment  of  foreign investors. 122
A second strategy was  a three-point program by  the Department  of  Commerce
123
to  encourage constructive  investment.  The  first step was  a census  of  the
124
estimated $18  billion worth  of  investments already  abroad.  Of  this,  $11.3
billion was  believed to  be  direct  investment, mostly  in  the extractive
125
industries  of Venezuela,  the Near East,  and Canada.  Secondly,  the  Department
would  provide  industry  with  up-to-date  information  on  foreign  developments  which
provided opportunities for private  investment.  This  information would  include
the  status of  local  laws,  the host nation's  capital structure, local  tax rates,
12b
and exchange availability.  Lastly,  in  order to meet  the  program's underlying
objectives,  the Department would urge businesses to provide  technical assistance
as  an integral part of  their investment.-15-
The most  important  initiative, however, was an  investment  guarantee program
under  the direction of  the  Export-Import Bank.  The Administration recognized
that,  however comprehensive, treaties  and  information programs would not  elimi-
128
nate all  the  risks  associated with foreign investment.  To reduce  these  risks
even further, and  thus increase  private investment,  it  proposed a self-funding
guarantee program which would insure qualifying investments against  risks  pecu-
liar  to foreign investment. 29 In  evaluating  these risks,  the Bank would con-
sider each nation seperately, extending guarantees only  if  the host  nation
demonstrated a willingness  to  cooperate  in establishing a proper  climate.130
131
The major risk guarantees would cover was  inconvertibility.  Bilateral
treaties  could not  totally eliminate this  risk since no  nation would surrender
sovereign control over  its  economy, and  since the  dollar shortage was  not
132
entirely  the fault  of  the LDC's.  Other risks which the  bill might  cover were
133
expropriation without compensation and loss  due  to war.  Only the  former was
134
included in the Administration's bill.  The  program would not  guarantee that
an investment would be  profitable or  ensure against  ordinary business  risks
135
such  as  Acts  of  God. 35
As  proposed, the Bank would offer guarantees  to  certain investors for  a
136
fee.  These fees would go  into a reserve  fund  from which claims would be
137
paid.  The government would be  subrogated  to  the  investor's  claim once it
138
paid off  on a guarantee.  The Bank promised not  to seek  priority status  for
139 its  claims,  however,  in  order to  avoid  creating further currency  shortages. 139
The main purpose was  to  attract  new,  productive  capital  to the  LDC's,  pri-
140
marily  from small business.  The  program would not  cover existing  investments
141
abroad.  Such an extension would exhaust  the  Bank's  resources and provide
142
investors with a safe  route  to withdraw  committed funds.  Existing invest-
143
ments would still receive protection from bilateral treaties,  however.  The-16-
guarantees also would not  cover investments of  only  financial  resources without
accompanying  capital.1   This  thus  excluded  the  sale  of  foreign  bonds  in
145
American  markets. 1
146
The bank would consider investments  on a case-by-case basis.  In order
to  qualify, each must demonstrate  an ability  to increase productivity and  pro-
147
duction overseas in a manner suited to  the  resources and  markets available. 47
They should be  efficiently managed and should increase  the host country's  net
148
exports  and dollar earning capacity.  Most importantly,  they should help
149
further  the process of  development and  improve national welfare.  In
evaluating each project,  the Bank would also look at  the  host  country,  the
character of  the investor,  the nature of  the enterprise, and  its  economic prac-
15U
ticality.  The bank would consult with the  host  country  in each case and
151
refrain from extending guarantees  to any  projects  it  opposed.
As part  of  this  evaluation some speakers recognized that  investors had
152
positive obligations  to  their host nations.  One way of  fulfilling  these
153
duties was to allow ample opportunity  for  local participation.  Fear of
exploitation was not  present, however, a fact which  one official  attributed  to
154
increased investor consciousness.154 The administration also dismissed  fears
that  tying the government to  the fate  of  foreign investment would increase  the
155
chances of  U.S.  intervention in support  of  private  investors.
Although there was no explicit  limit  on  the  amount of  guarantees  the
bank could undertake, all obligations would count  fully against  the  Bank's
current authorization,  the program would not  require appropriation of  any  new
156
funds.  Due  to  the experimental  nature of  this  program great flexibility was
157
vital  to its  success.
Underlying  the entire discussion was  the assumption that  increased foreign
investment would benefit the U.S.  through greater security and goodwill,-17-
158
increased exports, and  greater global prosperity.  Yet,  in spite of  interest
on the  part  of  other  nations,  and  the support  of  the  business  community, no one
was  certain that  such a program would  result  in greater  foreign investment  than
159
was  already  occurring.
The Administration also recognized that  certain investments, due  to  their
160
nature, would be  unable  to obtain private  funding.  In such cases LDC's  could
161 obtain  loans from the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank.  These loans
could take place only where adequate private financing was not  available.162
Although the  terms were not  specified, the  loans were  to  be  near  the market
rate, grant assistance was  not  an option except  in  certain situations where
Congress  authorized emergency assistance  to  meet  extreme disasters. 3
The State Department  also proposed  to make maximum use of  the United
164 Nations,  its  specialized agencies,  and other multilateral organizations.164
Drawing upon these  institutions would multiply  the financial and  human,  resources
165
available to development projects.  It  would serve  to  strengthen the  ability
of  these  organizations  to  act  as  constructive  forces in  international
affairs.  Finally,  it  would help eliminate some  of  the  conflicts which arose
between the donor  and host  in  bilateral assistance by easing the suspicions  of
167
the  recipients.
The Department of  Labor stressed  that  the program's  success depended upon
168
its  ability  to  benefit  the workers  of  the Third World.  To ensure  this,  it
cited programs  in  the field of  labor aimed at  upgrading  the  level  of  skills.
More importantly, Labor mentioned the need  to  develop adequate working standards
170
and improve  living  conditions.  To  ensure  this,  the government would protect
workers  from exploitation and  ensure  that  they  received a fair share  of  the
171
benefits  of  increased productivity.  The Department  supported extending  the
principles  of  collective bargaining, unionization, and minimum working con--18-
172 ditions  to  the Third World.  In addition,  the U.S.  would support programs  to
provide  services such  as unemployment  insurance,  employment  agencies, and
173
retraining centers.  These programs would be  run  both  bilaterally  and through
174
the  International Labor Organization.174
B.  Business  Interests
Most  of  the testimony  on  private enterprise's perception  of  economic devel-
opment  came  from established organizations  such as  the U.S.  Chamber of  Commerce
and  the Detroit Board of  Commerce, and individuals sympathetic  to  its  cause such
as  Norman M.  Littell and Congressman Herter.  Few individual businesses  engaged
in  foreign investment  spoke  before  the committees.
The business community  stressed the idea  that  the greatest potential LDC's
had  of  developing themselves  lay  in attracting private  investment.175  Only pri-
vate sources  could provide the  large amounts of  capital needed  for investment
176
without  threatening the economic health  of  the United States.  In addition,
only  the private sector could  bring with it  the managerial  and business  skills
177
needed  to make industry efficient.  In their  view the  central problem of
underdevelopment was  low productivity  resulting from inferior capital,  manage-
178
ment,  and supervision.
The main reason private investment was  not meeting the needs  of  LDC's  lay
in  the failure  of developing nations to  establish climates  competitive with
179
those in  the West.  Thus  much of  the  initiative rested with LDC's;  if they
followed  the proper policies,  the private  sector would respond favorably.1
According  to  this  view, the government's  role in development consisted
largely of  encouraging positive initiatives  on  the part  of  LDC's.
162
Negotiating bilateral  treaties was a major part  of  this.  These treaties
should commit LDC's  to giving private  investment  the same  treatment public
enterprises  received, eliminating double  taxation, providing prompt and adequate-19-
compensation for expropriation, and otherwise  creating an atmosphere suitable
for  private investment.  Many thought  the  successful negotiation  of  these
treaties  should be  a prerequisite  for participation  in the  technical  assistance
184
program.
The  business  community was  divided over  the  issue of  investment  guarantees.
Many enterprises already  committed  to ventures  abroad felt  that  any guarantee
185 program should cover old investments as  well.  To do otherwise would put  them
at  a competitive disadvantage against newer activities.  A few  companies even
opposed  the issuance  of  any guarantees, arguing  that it  merely  encouraged uncom-
1 87
petitive investment  abroad at  the  expense of  the American  capital market. 18 7
Most businessmen favored some  form of  guarantee program, however.  Even
with bilateral treaties,  businesses would still face unacceptable  risks
188^
investing abroad.  The government could  help encourage  foreign inves.tment  by
covering some of  these  risks. 9   A major  disagreement with the  administration
came over which risks  the program would cover.  The business  community wanted
guarantees  to  cover  inconvertibility, expropriation,  and all  other government
19U acts.  Repayment  should not  be  limited  to  sunk capital  but  should cover lost
191
earnings  and  profits  as  well.19
192
Some  speakers criticized the guarantees of  the Marshall Plan.  These
operated on a government-to-government  basis with guarantees counting as  offi-
193
cial assistance.  The acceptance  of  new  investments was within the govern-
194 ment's  discretion and  reduced  the amount of  other  aid it  could  receive.  As a
195 result Europeans  had a strong motive  to discourage use  of  the program.  In
extending guarantees  to  the  developing world, the  U.S.  must ensure that  they  did
190
not compete with other programs  of  the  Export-Import Bank.
In  its  operation of  the  technical assistance program, the  government  should
197
be  careful not  to compete with private enterprise.  Instead,  it  should limit-20-
its activities  to  technical assistance in  those fields  in which government had
demonstrated special competence,  such as  health, education, agricultural  exten-
sion, and  social services.1
The business  community was especially concerned  that  the government avoid
competing with the private  sector in  providing capital to  the developing
world.199   Such a program would quickly bankrupt  the United States economy
while  accomplishing  little.  The U.S.  should not  undertake equity
investments.  Loans by  the Export-Import Bank  and the World Bank must  be
202
available only in cases where private  funds were not.  Above all the U.S.
should impress LDC's  with the need to  follow appropriate policies  to  attract
203
private  investment. 03   If  they  did  the  business  community would respond with
204
new investments. 2   If  LDC's  failed to do  so,  they should  not be  able to  appeal
to government programs with the argument  that  the private  sector was  not  doing
205
its job.2   To  help ensure  this  neutrality, the  business community pressed for
legislation mandating the  fullest  use  of  private enterprise and establishing a
206
board  of  businessmen  to oversee  compliance with the  requirement.206
C.  The  Labor  Viewpoint
Labor organizations  tended to  show  strong support  for  the Point IV  ini-
tiative.  They equated success with tangible  improvements  in  the  living  stan-
dards  of  the working and peasant  classes.  Projects should  be  geared  toward
meeting the needs  of  their intended beneficiaries  since American prosperity was
207
directly linked to  the purchasing power  of  the world's  poor.
In  relation to private  investment,  this  meant Congress must  ensure that
effort went into protecting and  improving local  living  standards  as well  as  to
ensuring the security of  foreign investments.  The program should not  serve
as  a cover for exploitation and excessive profits for  business.  Instead,
Congress should make sure  that  workers  shared in the benefits  of  increased pro--21-
209
duction  through  higher wages and  better working conditions.  One way to  do
this  was  the  promotion of  free trade unions which  could engage  in  collective
210
bargaining with  business  groups.
The  labor community showed strong  support  for  opening up  trade with the
211
rest  of  the world.  It  specifically  discounted  the  threat  of  increased LDC
212
production  competing  with  American  jobs.212
D.  Agriculture
Organizations representing American agriculture voiced strong  support  for a
comprehensive Point  IV  program.  Although they  stressed the  need to expand
213
industrial production in both rural and  urban areas,  most of  their  comments
focused on rural development.  While the U.S.  could not  by  itself  create devel-
opment  abroad, it  could promote  the proper  self-help policies within LDA's  and
214
encourage private investment.  Because of  its  success  in the United States,
the  farm community  strongly advocated an active role  for  the government in spon-
soring agricultural extension services,  cooperatives,  land grant  colleges, and
215
experiment stations.  These methods  had already  proven successful in Latin
America.2
Like labor,  the agricultural producers were  not  concerned with the  threat
217
of  competition from LDC's.  They saw  increased food production as  a necessary
prerequisite to  development  and expected  that most  of  it would  be consumed
218
internally  rather than exported.  These organizations  also supported  heavy
219
involvement  by  the U.N. 2
E.  Charitable Groups
A  large  variety of  religious  and  civic groups adopted  a more  humanitarian
attitude toward the proposed program.  These groups  tended to  be  less  concerned
220 with  the  political  or  strategic  possibilities  behind  Point  IVo  Instead  they-22-
221
found their main rationale  in  the moral implications  of  conditions  overseas.
For  them, the  primary purpose of  the  program was  to  meet  local  needs  by  raising
222
low productivity and  low living standards.  As  such, it  formed the moral
underpinning of  American foreign policy.2
These groups measured the program's  success  largely in  terms  of  its  effect
on poverty.  They stressed  the need  to  isolate the program from political  con-
224
siderations.  To  ensure this,  all groups  gave strong support  to heavy
225 involvement of  the United Nations  and  other multilateral  agencies.  This
would reduce the  suspicion of  LDC's  toward the  new initiatives  of  the West and
22b
lessen the amount  of  friction between donor and  recipient nations.  It would
227
also give  the U.S.  access to a wider  body  of  technical  expertise  in the  field.2 27
228
These groups  advocated a broad, long term effort.  They supported an
active role by  the government in creating the economic  and physical infrastruc-
ture necessary to make private investment  possible and were skeptical of  claims
that private investment would arrive in sufficient amounts  once  it  received
229
proper guarantees.  As a result of  this  skepticism they were more  concerned
that  the  benefits  of  development go  to  local citizens and  not  foreign capital-
230
ists.  Many  sought  assurances  that  the government would not use the program
231
to underwrite breathtaking profits due  to exploitation.  Private  investment
should be tailored  to  the needs  and priorities  of  the  host  nation and not  vice-
232
versa.  They also  stressed the  role  private organizations such as  their  own
233
should play  in  the program.
This  group of  speakers  also  tended to stress  successful programs  of  the
234
past, especially  those in  China and Latin America.  These programs
demonstrated what  a few dedicated people could  do when provided with  the  proper
support and  funding.  The new effort  was  to  be  an extension of  these efforts  to
the  level of official policy.  Although a few groups  desired increased capi--23-
236
tal  expenditures in  the  future,  most were  content with  limiting  the  program
to  technical  as  opposed  to  economic assistance,
F.  Congress
Although many senators  and congressmen on  both  the authorization and
appropriations committees expressed  skepticism about  various parts  of  the
program, few opposed the  principle behind it.  According to  party lines,  their
views  generally  followed  one  of  two  main  philosophies.
The  liberal view, supported by  most Democrats, favored  the Administration's
proposal.  They viewed  it  as  a significant  extension of  previous efforts  and  a
237
bold new  foreign policy  initiative.  If  properly run  it  would become a major
238
cornerstone  of  U.S.  policy  overseas.
This side  tended to  be skeptical about  the willingness  of  the private sector
239.
to move large sums  of  capital overseas.  Although they  supported the idea of
encouraging  such investment  through guarantees  and  the elimination of  double  tax-
240
ation,  they questioned  the degree  to which this would eliminate the need  for
241
public funds.  Many were  concerned  that,  left  to  themselves, American firms
would exploit  the developing countries  through  low pay  and  sweatshop  condi-
242
tions.42  To counteract  this  the  law should  require private investment  to  raise
243
the  living standards  in LDC's  and  reward increased production with  higher wages.
The  conservative  side, whose main proponent  was Congressman Herter of
Massachusetts,  favored  his  alternative bill which placed greater emphasis  on  the
need to  attract private  investment  as  a prerequisite  to  successful
244
development.  They  supported the view of  the  business  community  that  the
main reason greater investment was  not  occuring was  the hostile  conditions
245
existing overseas.
This  view favored making improvement  of  investment  climates  a condition  to
246
participation in the  technical  assistance program.  It  discounted the  threat-24-
of  corporate  exploitation  and  concentrated  instead  on  the  dangers  of  excessive
247
government  involvement.24 7  In particular the government  should  be  careful  that
246
its activities  did not  compete with  the public  sector.  They tended  to  favor
24•
explicit  restrictions  on  the agency's scope  of  power and discretion.249
A few  congressmen were skeptical about  the need for any  program at  all.
Although they supported the general  idea of  technical  assistance,  they
questioned  the need for  new legislation, arguing that  the proposed program was
authorized under existing legislation.  One member in particular, viewed the
251
new  proposals as  little more than a politically motivated give-away program.
None  of  the  committee members  supported large public expenditures  in con-
nection with the program.  Many were concerned  about  the  risk  of  creating a new
252
program which could later grow  to  require  large appropriations.  Although
some recognized  the need for  greater public funds  to  compensate for  insufficient
253
private  investment,  many feared  that  the U.S. would be  forced to  supply large
amounts of  capital in order to save  face when proposed projects failed  to  obtain
254
adequate funding elsewhere.  This possibility raised real concerns  about  its
255
effect on the American economy, especially at  a time  of  high deficits.
There was also general agreement  on working with UN  agencies  as  part
25b
of  the program.  There was a serious  disagreement over the method of  pro-
viding  these agencies with funds,  however.  Many members  of  the Senate
Appropriations Committee were incensed that  the Administration had pledged  $10
million to  a new  development program within the  U.N.  before Congress  had
257
authorized  it.  They felt  that  in doing  so,  the Administration had  usurped
Congress'  power by  forcing  its  hand.
In  retrospect,  the original Point  IV  program appears  to  be  an enlightened,
if  modest,  attempt  to  address the  causes  of  underdevelopment  overseas.  The
government's  role was not  to extend beyond organizing  technical assistance  pro--25-
jects  to  correct  the  gaps  of knowledge and  health existing between the Third
World  and  the West.  Somewhat naively, public  officials  relied almost  exclusi-
vely  on  private industry  to  provide  the  capital necessary to  ensure success.
Had this  reliance proved justified, U.S.  assistance  need  not  have  gone  beyond
the  modest amounts needed for  technical assistance.  For one  reason  or another,
however, private capital flows never approached  the amounts LDC's were
demanding.  This unsatisfied demand,  together with new political  considerations,
resulted  in a movement  of  U.S.  aid  beyond the  original small  scale projects.
The  Movement  Toward  Security
by  1952  the  program's  emphasis had changed noticeably.  The Korean War added
new momentum to  the growing cold war,  leading  to a remilitarization  campaign in
both the U.S. and Europe.  As  a result,  aid under the Marshall Plan continued
beyond its scheduled'termination date  of  1952.  Its  rationale shifted, however,
from financing the reconstruction of  war-Itorn economies  to underwriting the
procurement  of  necessary  commodities  which,  but  for  U.S.  aid,  would  lead  to  a
259
diversion of  resources  from the Allie's remilitarization efforts.259
Security  concerns easily  spilled over  to discussions  of  economic and  tech-
nical aid.  A basic premise  of  U.S.  foreign policy was  that  Russia would take
260U
advantage  of  weakness or  disintegration wherever it  found it.  To combat
this,  the  U.S.  sought  to  build  up  collective  defense  capabilities  as  quickly  as
2b1
possible on  the  basis  of  self-help  and mutual  aid.  Development assistance
thus  increasingly linked up with  the overall foreign policy  concerns  of  the
U.S.,  including  its  military assistance programs.  At  this  time  the Administra-
tion was  telling Congress  that  recent  communist  advances threatened the national
2o2
security  and that  the U.S.  was  in  danger of  losing Asia and  the Middle East
2to  Russia.  Economic and technical  assistance programs were necessary  to to  Russia.  Economic  and  technical  assistance  programs  were  necessary  toensure military  security abroad.  As a result  the political-security aspects
of  technical assistance quickly  became  its  main selling point.2
These  concerns affected  the  technical assistance program.  Beginning in
1951,  hearings on development  aid were  incorporated into  those  on  the  broader
foreign aid bill, with the better part  of  the  time  devoted  to  the European
remilitarization program.  Also in  that year,  Congress amended the assistance
Act to read:
"No economic or  technical assistance shall be  supplied to any  other
nation unless  the President  finds that  the supplying of  such
assistance will strengthen the security of  the United States  and
promote world peace,  and unless  the recipient  country has agreed
to join in promoting international understanding and  good will and
in maintaining world peace, and to  take such action as may be  266
mutually agreed upon  to eliminate causes  of  international  tension.
Another manifestation of  this  linkage was  the Mutual Security Act of  1951,
267
which combined both economic and military  assistance in the  same bill.  This
legislation placed the Technical Cooperation Agency under the supervision  of  the
2bb
Mutual Security Agency.  Under  this  arrangement TCA was  to have wide autonomy
269
and  remain insulated from security programs.  However, not all  technical
assistance came from TCA.  In Southeast Asia, where  the communist  threat was
most immediate,  technical assistance programs came  directly under  the MSA which
270
integrated them into  a broader program including military aid.  The MSA
2 7 1
also continued  to handle technical  assistance to  the African colonies.  In
spite  of  this  large responsibility, technical  assistance still comprised  less
272
than 10%  of  the  total MSA budget.
Another major difference between the  1952  bill and  its  predecessors  was  the
dramatic increase in  capital requests.  The Administration targeted most  of  this
273
aid  for three countries;  India, Pakistan, and  Iran.  Due to  the  immediacy of
the communist  threat'to  these nations,  highlighted by  recent  communist victories
in local Indian elections,  the assistance programs were to be  qualitatively dif--27-
274
ferent from those elsewhere.  The TCA would supervise  the transfer  of  large
amounts of  capital  to  this  region in  an attempt to  accelerate the  process  of
development  and telescope twenty or  more years  of  development  into four or
275
five.
Even in areas where the basic characteristics  of  technical assistance did
not  change,  budget  requests  increased, with greater emphasis placed on  capital
276
costs  to  accompany  the regular personnel expenses.  Officials justified these
277
expenditures  as  necessary complements  to  the exchange of  knowledge.  If  pilot
programs were to  succeed, field personnel had  to  have the  equipment  needed to
278
demonstrate the worth of  new techniques.  Only when LDC's  had  seen physical
evidence that  a new idea was  better, would they  invest  their own  resources
279
into expanding its use.  This was  true even in nations  enjoying positive
28O
foreign exchange flows. 28
Administration officials dismissed fears  about  the program's  impact  on  the
national deficit.  They viewed the  deficit's  size as  negligible compared to  the
naton's  GNP,  characterizing it  as  a temporary  imbalance rather than a structural
problem.2   Its  significance paled in  comparison to  the more  immediate  threat
29  2
communism posed  to national security.282
Officials  also  dismissed charges  that  the program was moving along  too
283
slowly.  Many opponents of  Point  IV  had argued that  no new appropriations
284
were needed since the  previous year's  funds were not  all committed yet.  But
administration officials  countered  that,  due to  the  lateness with which Congress
had appropriated its  funds,  the TCA had  not  had  time  to expend  the  funds
285
properly.  It  was  expected that,  by  the  end  of  the  fiscal year almost  all
286
the  funds would be gone.  Another inhibiting factor  to the  program's expan-
sion continued to  be  the serious  lack of  skilled technicians available  for ser-
287
vice overseas.-28-
By 1952,  much of  the official development network was  already in place.  It
was  thus possible to evaluate  the actions  of  agencies.  The World Bank had
already-  shifted its  emphasis from the reconstruction of Europe to  the develop-
258
ment of Latin America, the Middle East  and Southeast Asia.  It expected to
loan approximately $300 million in  1953,  mostly for  capital development
289
projects.  The Bank was  also engaged  in technical assistance activities in
LDC's  in addition to  its loan activities, principally  in  the form of  background
290O
surveys.  Its  activity was  limited, however,  by  the need to  raise money in
291
U.S.  capital markets.  In light of  this  the Bank claimed  that  it  had made  as
292
many loans  as  it  appropriately could.  Although  there was some  support for  the
establishment of  an International Finance Corporation within  the Bank to  help
293  294
finance private investments,  opinion on its merits was mixed.  A Bank
official pointed out *that private foreign investment was decreasing primarily
295 because  of  poor  local climates and not  because of  a lack of  capital.295
The International Monetary Fund also received criticism for sitting on its
resources.  The U.S.  director of  the Fund defended its  record stating  that,  in
accordance with U.S. wishes, the IMF  limited its  operations to  temporary stabili-
zation operations and  did not  finance relief  or  reconstruction efforts  or  the
296
large and sustained outflows of  capital needed for economic  development.  Its
primary purpose was to help  nations  solve  temporary financial and monetary
297
problems and  to encourage free exchange and  trade policies.297
At  this  time  it  was  also  easier to  see what shape U.S.  bilateral assistance
was  taking.  In  spite of  the increased emphasis  on  capital investments  to  accom-
pany technical advice,  the main focus  of  American eftorts was  still on  small
298
scale pilot  projects.  The central  idea was  that these  projects would serve
as  a means  of  pump-priming, stimulating a larger flow  of  both domestic and
299
foreign private investment.  Projects would continue  to concentrate  on-29-
300
teaching LDC's  new methods.  Although technical  experts working on  these
programs were exclusively American, efforts  were underway to  train  local offi-
cials  to  replace them.30
The Administration defended placing  such programs  on a grant  rather  than
302  303 loan basis.302 Loans still  financed the majority  of development  efforts;  303 TCA
was  providing grant aid  only  to  fund technical assistance, not project  capital
304
costs,  and  then only where  the LDC was  truly unable to  pay for  technical
305 services  itself.  Projects which were fundable with loans were  refused and
30b
referred  instead  to  the Export-Import Bank.  Officials  thus  requested that
Congress  repeal a requirement passed  the year before  that  it  make  at  least  10%
307
of  its  expenditures on a loan, rather  than grant  basis.
Grant aid was also justified by  the feeling  that  it  was more productive to
have LDC's  increase their  contribution to  current projects  than pay  back the
308
U.S.  for past  expenditures.  As  a result  the TCA expected LDC's  to gradually
309
assume a larger role in  financing development programs.  The U.S.  was
310
currently funding African projects  on a 1 to  1  basis.  In Latin America where
similar efforts  had  a longer history, the  ratio was 3 to  1, with every U.S.
311
dollar matched by  three  local ones.
The emphasis of  these projects was on  getting  .benefits directly to  the
312
people.  Assistance was concentrated  on increasing food production, educa-
313
tion, and  health services as  opposed to  industrial production.  To  be effec-
tive  in combatting  communism, there must  be equitable  distribution of  the
314
benefits  of  increased production.  Although  there was a limit,  to  the
Administration's  power overseas,  officials  recognized the need to  press  for
appropriate  structural changes within LDC's  in the  areas of  labor and
316
manpower.  At  the same  time,  the Administration warned Congress against
placing political conditions  on economic  aid such  as  conditioning assistance to-30-
Africa  on  progress  toward  decolonization. 3 17
The  programs  in Asia  typified much of  this.  In American eyes,  this  region
was  characterized by  three  central facts,  a critical shortage  of  trained admin-
istrators and  technicians,  the existence of  a growing  economic and  social  revo-
lution brought  about by  rising expectations which provided a breeding ground
for communism, and the  existence of  valuable  raw materials  vital  to U.S.
318
security  interests.  This  combination made American technical  assistance
advisable.  Although the initiative of  such programs always  rested with the
319
recipient government,  U.S. goals  sought to  build strong,  stable governments,
support  the buildup  of  military and  internal security  forces  to  combat  com-
munism, further economic progress,  and advance  the development  of  raw materials
320
exports.  All this was best done with an emphasis on getting  the benefits of
321
development  to  the  people.
To do  this U.S.  programs  concentrated largely on  the agricultural
322
sector.  Although it  did not  seek  to finance major capital installations,
323 American grants would be used  to eliminate obvious economic bottlenecks.323
This  was  accompanied  by  a  serious  attempt  to  replace  grants  with  loans  as
324
programs  progressed.  Eventually,  indigenous institutions would arise  to
325
replace  American  assistance. 3 2 5
The response of  various  interest  groups was  also subtle but distinct.
For the  most part each held  to  its  original position, modifying it  only in
response  to the Administration's  increased emphasis  on security concerns.
The main areas of  contention centered not  on  the  existence of  the security
threat,  but  on the proper policies  to  deal with it  and  the  effect  of  large
capital expenditures  on the American economy.
The business  community stepped up  its  opposition  to  large government
expenditures.  Several speakers argued  that new authorizations should not-31-
326
exceed $5 billion.  Since  $8  billion of  previously  approved funds
327
remained unspent, no new appropriations were necessary.
Business  leaders expressed concern  about the  effect ot  large  foreign
aid programs  on an economy  already suffering from high  tax rates  and a
328
growing deficit.  They  feared the  foreign aid program was fast  becoming a
329 self-perpetuating program with its  own bureaucracy.  Such programs  served
330 only  to underwrite unwise LDC economic policies  based on socialism.  This
331 in turn  reduced the  flow of  private  investment  into these areas.  To pre-
vent  this,  foreign aid  funds should be  scaled down and conditioned on  reci-
pient governments pursuing strict policies  leading to  balanced budgets,  the
elimination of  overly ambitious welfare or public works projects,  and  the
332 removal of  unwise  restrictions on commerce and currency.  In addition,
more  capital flows  should take place between businesses  rather than between
333
governments.  There was  also widespread questioning of  the  belief  that
334 foreign aid led  to improved  international relations.
The Labor community accused  the U.S.  Chamber of  Commerce of  distorting
335
the  nature of  economic aid.  While  the unions agreed with the Administra-
tion on the need  to respond  to Communist threats overseas,  they placed more
336
importance on economic  as  opposed to military  aid.  Only  the  former would
address  the underlying economic dissatisfaction which imperiled  the  security
337
of  friendly  governments.
Union leaders  urged Congress  to place  heavier reliance on  the  role  of
economic assistance in guaranteeing security.33   To  do  this,  economic funds
should be  increased and should  result  in  tangible improvements  in  the  stan-
339
dards  of  living abroad.  The U.S.  should not  rely solely on  private
3 4 0
enterprise  and  the  "trickle-down"  theory.-32-
In addition to  increases  in the  amounts  of  foreign aid, two  other reforms
were  needed.  The first was  to  increase  the  economic power  of  workers  through
341
the  establishment  of  free trade unions.  The  second was  to condition  aid to
both LDC governments and  private industry on  the pursuance of  policies which
342
would distribute the  benefits of  increased production among the masses.
The farm community also urged Congress to place more emphasis on  economic
343
as  opposed to military assistance.  While it  mentioned  the danger of
overappropriation and  the establishment of  a permanent staff  in charge of  the
344
program,  it  supported the Administration's  request  and believed that  any
345
budget cuts  should come out of  military assistance.  Like labor,  it  also
346
stressed the positive effects aid  had on  the U.S.  economy.  Like most  other
groups,  it  supported making aid conditional  on the pursuance of  appropriate
347
development policies.
Charitable groups expressed degrees of  opposition to  the growing polariza-
tion of  foreign aid.  Some completely  opposed the Mutual Security Program as  a
plan for escalating the Cold War.34 8  Most, while agreeing with the
Administration on the increased security  threat, opposed  its obsession with
349
military as opposed  to  economic assistance.  In  their  eyes,  current expen-
350
ditures were yielding large  dividends  and increasing America's  prosperity.
More  than any other group,  they supported maintaining, or even increasing,  the
351
levels of  aid.35 1
A number of  issues  arose in  Congressional remarks  on  the  new proposal.
While  support for  technical assistance  remained strong, many congressmen
expressed concern with the increase in  capital expenditures.  They were  con-
cerned that Point  IV was expanding beyond its  original mandate by  providing  too
352
much material assistance.  These growing  costs adversely affected the
353
nation's economic health and undercut  the dollar.  A  few congressmen saw  the-33-
program as  a wise investment, however. stressing the  positive effects develop-
354
ment would have  on U.S.  trade  and world  stability.354
The source  of  threats  to  stability was  also  in  dispute.  Conservative  mem-
355
bers  of  Congress  stressed the military  threat  posed by  Communism.  Their
liberal counterparts  tended to see  this  as a symptom of  more fundamental sources
356
of  unrest  such as economic  poverty and  colonialism.  The latter thus  placed
greater emphasis on  the  role  of  economic assistance and support  for independence
in addressing the problem.357   They supported the Administration's  request.358




There was-a reaffirmation that  Congress had intended  to  support  basic
360
rather than industrial development.  Even strong supporters  of  the program
emphasized  that  its  size  must  be  limited  by  the  availability  of  skilled  tech-
nicians to  transfer knowledge and the ability of  host  countries  to assert
361
changes.  Administrators  should refrain from using hard-sell tactics  to rush
362
projects  by  recipient governments.
A few  congressmen questioned the  belief  that  economic development would
363
bring political.stability.  They foresaw  that  in many cases  such development
364
would undercut the established order, creating a political vacuum.  Some  mem-
bers viewed this  as a positive development,  at  least where  the  old  government
365
had opposed changes necessary  to economic progress.  Others, however, worried
366
about  the consequences  to  U.S.  security.
Beyond  1952
by  1952  the  foreign aid program had  changed considerably.  It  has  started  as
an economic effort  to transfer  technical knowledge  to  LDC's  through  a large
number  of  small scale pilot  projects.  Its supporters generally believed that
in the long run  this would promote expanded world  trade and political stability.-34-
Over  the  next  two  years  the  program began  to  involve larger amounts  of  capital
assistance  in a few select  nations.  This change  reflected an  increased emphasis
on  short  term political  and  security concerns.
Since  1952  the  term "foreign aid" has  encompassed both of  these distinct
policies;  one  viewing assistance primarily as  part  of  a long-term effort  to  pro-
mote economic and humanitarian aims,  and  the other focusing more on  its  short-
term political and security effects.  Each policy has  developed its  own
constituency.  Because  each policy  reflects  a different set  of assumptions  and
priorities,  these  two constituencies have  competed against each other  in an
attempt  to shape foreign policy  in  their mold.  They  have also had to  battle
others who opposed the  concept  of  foreign aid completely.
By 1952,  the program had come  to increasingly  reflect short-term security
goals.  This continued until the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress
when longer term development  once again rose to  the  fore.-35-
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